

Mimesis Aegis: A Mimicry Privacy Shield

A System's Approach to Data Privacy on Public Cloud

Billy Lau

Simon Chung

Chengyu Song

Yeongjin Jang

Wenke Lee

Alexandra Boldyreva

INTRODUCTION

Unsatisfactory Status Quo

- Users do not have control over their data that is communicated over public cloud
 - Rely on server to secure user's data
 - Conflict of interest for data privacy between users and public cloud service (PCS) providers
 - E.g. WhatsApp, Viber, WeChat, etc.



Changing the Status Quo


- Can be solved if users use end-to-end encryption
 - Hard to use in practice
- Existing solutions:
 - Requires user to be trained to use custom apps to perform safe communication
 - Have questionable data isolation model

Mimesis Aegis



- Applies end-to-end encryption to users' communication data while preserving user experience by:
 - Mimicking GUIs of app-of-interest
 - Interacting with app-of-interest on behalf of user
- Good isolation model
- Generalizable across different apps in the same category
- Resilient to app updates

Mimesis Aegis - WhatsApp



Mimesis Aegis - WhatsApp



RELATED WORK

Standalone Solutions

- Protect data confidentiality
- Good isolation from untrusted entities
- Examples: PGP, Gibberbot, TextSecure, SafeSlinger, FlyByNight, etc.
- Problem:
 - Requires open protocol
 - Do not preserve user experience



Browser Plugins/Extensions

- Provides transparent integration with applications of interest
- Examples:
 - Scramble!, TrustSplit, NOYB, SafeButton, etc.
- Problem: Only applicable to web applications.
 - How about mobile devices?

App Rewriting/Repackaging

- Provides transparent integration with applications of interest
- Examples:
 - Aurasium, Dr. Android, etc.
- Problems:
 - Breaks app updates
 - The security of the reference monitor may be compromised as it resides in the same address space as the untrusted entity

SYSTEM DESIGN

Design Goals

- Offer good security
 - Strong isolation from untrusted entities
- Preserve user experience
 - Transparent interaction with existing apps
- Easy to maintain and scale
 - A sufficiently general-purpose approach

Threat Model




- Untrusted parties:
 - Public cloud service (PCS) providers
 - Client-side apps
 - Middle boxes between a PCS and client-side app

Threat Model

- Trusted components:
 - Hardware
 - Operating System (OS)
 - Soft keyboard
 - M-Aegis components
 - The user

M-Aegis Architecture

- Layer 7.5



M-Aegis Architecture

- UI Automation Manager (UIAM)
 - Gives M-Aegis the context of the screen
 - Provides information to correctly render mimic GUIs on L-7.5
 - Relays user input to the underlying app

M-Aegis Architecture

- Per-Target Client App (TCA) Logic
 - Processes UI tree to determine a TCA's current UI state
 - Makes sense out of the information gathered from UIAM
 - Decides suitable actions for different UI states

M-Aegis Architecture

- Cryptographic Module
 - Key Manager
 - Searchable Encryption Scheme
 - Easily-Deployable Efficiently-Searchable Symmetric Encryption Scheme (EDESE)

USER WORKFLOW

Demo Video with WhatsApp



EVALUATIONS

Performance Evaluations

- Experimental Setup:
 - Stock Android phone (LG Nexus 4)
 - Android 4.4.2 (Kit Kat, API Level 19)
 - Each experiment is repeated 10 times and the average is taken

Performance Evaluations

- Preview Encrypted Email:
 - 76 ms to render plaintext on L-7.5
 - Well within expected response time (50 – 150 ms)
- Composing and Sending Encrypted Email:
 - Used Enron Email Dataset
 - With longest email:
 - 953 words, of which 362 are unique
 - 205 ms to encrypt, build the search index, and encode

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

- Users can now regain control over their private data using Mimesis Aegis, where:
 - Plaintext is never visible to client apps
 - Original user experience is preserved
 - Technique is generalizable to a large number of apps and is resilient to app updates



Questions?